IT WOULD BE AN “AFFRONT TO JUSTICE” TO ALLOW THE CLAIMANT’S CLAIM TO SUCCEED: “LIES IN THE COURSE OF LITIGATION ARE OFFENSIVE TO THE COURT”: SOME VERY UNCLEAN HANDS…

March 10, 2025 · by · in Civil evidence

We are looking again at the judgment of HHJ Paul Matthews in Bains v Irshad & Anor [2025] EWHC 491 (Ch). This time about the consequences of telling lies to the court.  The equitable doctrine that most lawyers remember best is the requirement of “clean hands” when seeking to benefit from the court.  The judge stated that, if had found that the claimant was entitled to any equitable remedy, this doctrine would have prevented the claimant from benefitting.

 

“Such lies in the course of litigation are offensive to the court. They strike at the root of our society, the rule of law and the enforcement of legal rights.”

 

THE CASE

The claimant brought an action against the defendant claiming a right to own a hotel.  The claim was rejected by the trial judge. Not least because the judge found that the claimant had lied about many issues.

THE JUDGMENT ON THE IMPACT OF LYING

Having considered, and rejected, the claimant’s case in detail, the judge considered whether, if the claimant had been entitled to any equitable remedies, he would have been granted any form of relief.

 

“Clean hands

    1. The equitable doctrine of clean hands, however, presents more difficulty. This is because the facts that I have found disclose that, in the course of the events described in this judgment, the claimant has lied extensively to both public authorities and private bodies in a number of significant ways. These lies include:

 

(1) the obtaining of passports from the Indian government in the name of Aamer Gull, although there was no such person distinct from the claimant;

(2) the obtaining and use of a UK residence permit and a council tax payment card in the name of Aamer Gull;

(3) the lies told to life assurance companies in applications for life assurance in September 1993 and in July 2005.

(4) the obtaining and deployment of a fake death certificate from Dr Madhu Deodhar for Aamer Gull;

(5) the obtaining of a probate for the estate of Aamer Gull, although there was no such person distinct from the claimant himself, and he (the claimant) had not died;

(6) taking part in the making of false life assurance claims in respect of the alleged death of Aamer Gull;

(7) asserting that he was the first defendant’s spouse or civil partner for the purposes of making a Home Rights application;

(8) putting forward the form P60 purporting to show Aamer Gull as an employee of a company which did not then exist;

(9) obtaining and deploying the photograph which the Cardiff shop was asked to fake.

    1. These lies were repeated in the course of making the present claim. The claimant could have told the truth (that is, that there was no such person as Aamer Gull separate from the claimant) and still argued for his rights on the basis that he and the first defendant bought the properties and ran the business together. But instead he persisted in the childish charade that Aamer Gull really existed and did die. It has been an integral part of the dishonest way that this claim has been put.

 

    1. Such lies in the course of litigation are offensive to the court. They strike at the root of our society, the rule of law and the enforcement of legal rights. I remind myself of the statement of Nugee J in Holyoak v Candy, already cited, that

 

“the Court is bound to take a particularly adverse view of a litigant who lies in the course of litigation, as this undermines the Court process itself.”

    1. As stated in the authorities referred to earlier, the test is whether the claimant’s misconduct has “an immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for”. But the authorities show that for this purpose misconduct can go beyond mere attempts to mislead the court by creating a false case, and can extend to the case where the claimant seeks to support an otherwise truthful case with fabricated evidence.

 

    1. If I had considered that the claimant’s claims had any merits, then, in my judgment, it would have been an affront to justice to allow him to succeed on them in the way that he has presented his case. In such circumstances, the claimant has not come to court with clean hands, and I would not have awarded the claimant any equitable remedy. That would include any remedy in constructive trust, proprietary estoppel or under Pallant v Morgan, all of which depend upon the court’s considering that it would be unconscionable for the legal owner of property to insist on her rights. In the event, of course, this makes no difference to the result.

 

CONCLUSION

  1. For the reasons given above, I dismiss the claimant’s claims in their entirety. Given my findings as to the lies which the claimant and his associates have told in the course of this litigation, and my findings as to the behaviour of the claimant more generally, I propose to send the papers in this case to the Director of Public Prosecutions.
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